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osewalrusNevertheless, I'll give it a try.
My personal take: Hamas played their hand well, and Israel rose to the bait. But it is unclear to me that it changes much in the long run.
To fully analyze the event and their potential aftermath, and what the sides were going for, it is necessary to step back and engage in a somewhat broader analysis. I am not trying to assign blame or right or wrong. Most people stop on the moral question and come down wherever they come down. My belief is that analysis is a separate-but-related issue from understanding the strategy and possible outcomes. It is not irrelevant or immaterial. But it is my belief that it is helpful to run the analysis along separate but related tracks.
Gaza is currently run by Hamas. In theory, Hamas and Fatah are supposed to be unifying. In practice, Hamas wants a deal with Fatah similar to what Hezbollah has in Lebanon. A major say in politics and an independent armed force. Fatah is not prepared to do that. They want Hamas to become a political party with no special status or privileges beyond being a political party.
Hamas is seriously on the outs with just about every major Arab Sunni government except Qatar because of their support for the Islamic Brotherhood back when they were running Egypt, and because the Sunni governments would like to settle the whole damn Israel/Palestine thing so they can concentrate on fighting Iran (and/or Turkey, which is also Sunni but not Arab and which has regional ambitions that the more ambitious players (i.e., Egypt and Saudi Arabia) dislike. Hamas has seen its overall support in Gaza and among the Palestinians generally erode as the armed resistance has yielded no results beyond even worse suffering in Gaza as compared to the West Bank territories run by Fatah.
Nevertheless, Hamas still enjoys considerable legitimacy and support from Palestinians for their armed resistance to "the Occupation" (by which they mean the existence of Israel as a Jewish state; polling shows very little support among Palestinians for a two-state solution). While Palestinians have determined that direct military confrontation of the kind employed in 2014, 2010 and 2007 is useless, they are not happy with the general cooperation of Fatah with Israel either.
Hamas recently underwent a major shift in leadership with the appointment of Ismail Hanayeh as operational commander in Gaza. Hanayeh has initiated a major shift in strategy. The recent protests are his first major operation.
Hanayeh's strategy is fairly straightforward but also fairly clever. The organized effort to cross the border into Israel by unarmed protesters creates a difficult problem for Israel. No government permits the crossing of its borders by unauthorized individuals. Use of deadly force to protect the border is generally regarded as permissible, even against unarmed border crossers. But the justification of shooting border crossers is a function of security -- border crossers may be assumed to be criminals or a security threat. When it is clear that border crossers are unarmed individuals, the rules of engagement change. (The United States is undergoing a flip from avoiding the use of deadly force to the use of deadly force.) A large mass of unarmed people crossing the border in protest and determined to penetrate the border therefore presents an insoluble dilemma to country: fire and use deadly force, and therefore take condemnation for firing on unarmed civilians, or allow penetration of the border.
To be clear, i do not consider Hanayeh's calculations to be particularly immoral. They regard this as war, and regard this protest as necessary to shift the political calculus. All the protesters were fully aware that the Israelis would use deadly force and volunteered. Nor is it clear to me that Israel had a good set of alternatives in their response. They reasoned that lesser means of crowd dispersal would be ineffective and that loss of life on the Palestinian side was inevitable. Again, the entire point of strategy from the Hamas side is to maneuver Israel into a no-win response. In this they were successful.
Tangible Outcomes From Hamas Strategy.
Hanayeh clearly recognizes that he needs to change Hamas' political status as outcasts in the Arab world, redirect world outrage against Israel, and re-establish Hamas legitimacy among Palestinians as a superior alternative to Fatah. In this they are largely successful. Indeed, news reports are that Hanayeh has gone to Egypt to negotiate with Egyptians for humanitarian support and economic aid (possibly with the promise of stopping the protests as a bargaining chip). Egypt's current government does not like Hamas because they are an offshoot of the Islamic Brotherhood and had close ties with the previous Egyptian government. Egypt also accuses Hamas of supporting ISIS in the Sinai, although Hamas denies this. Additionally, Hamas is suspect because it receives support from Iran.
But the protests and the Israeli deadly response have a predictable effect on Egyptian popular opinion. It makes it extremely hard for Sissi to reject Hamas' request, which is what Sissi would undoubtedly like to do. Egypt has been instrumental in the last few years in bringing economic devastation to Gaza as a means of forcing Hamas to surrender to Fatah. The last thing they want to do is alleviate that economic pressure when Gaza is on the brink of collapse. But the Egyptian people hugely support the Palestinian "martyrs" against the evil Zionist oppressors. Additionally, Egypt would gain some leadership points in the Arab world for being seen as brokering a cessation of violence on the Gaza border.
Depending on the outcome, the prospect of economic aid from Egypt and lifting the restrictions on the Egypt/Gaza border alone would be a victory that made the sacrifice of he protestors' lives worth it (at least from a military standpoint). But the result also enhances Hamas as the "true" leaders of the resistance with Palestinians in the West Bank, making it harder for Fatah to press aggressively for re-unification on its own terms. It drives a wedge between Israel and its potential Arab allies against Iran, preventing continuing normalization of relations between Israel and the Sunni Arab world. All of these serve Hamas' primary political objective.
Finally, and most significantly, the protests are designed to delegitimize the U.S. recognition of West Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and prevent other countries from following. In this, again, Hanayeh's strategy has been enormously successful. It is extremely easy to get people in the world angry at Trump. Even those who support Israel and support a two-state solution are likely to blame the move of the embassy to Jerusalem rather than Hamas for the deaths and injuries. Hanayeh may even hope to see a replay of the economic hardship that followed the Israeli military operation in 2002 and forced Sharon to pull Israel out of Gaza.
Israel Response: Whether the Storm
Israel's response is to play the long game and whether the storm. For one thing, Israel has relatively few options to the contrary. Israel's long-standing policies lock in its responses. Additionally, the refusal of Israel to negotiate directly with Hamas (in fairness, Hamas likewise refuses to negotiate with Israel) prevents the sort of negotiated settlement that has allowed Israel to negotiate deals with Fatah.
Israel's calculation is based on the assessment that nothing significant is likely to change that it can't manage. U.S. support is even more firm under Trump than under Bush. Bush understood the need to maintain European allies and Arab allies. Trump believes U.S. does what it wants and allies can suck it. But additionally, both Europe and the Arab world have changed since the 00s. However Sunni Arab governments may act in the short term, there is still Iran and other factors driving toward normalization of relations with Israel. Europe remains as pro-Palestinian and anti-Israel as ever, but the rise of the European right has enhanced both isolationism and anti-Arabism as well. While Israel is likely to see a decline in tourism and economic trade with the EU in the near term, I anticipate it will be considerably less of a decline than happened in the 00s.
Additionally, Israel has broader relations with India and various East African nations. While South Africa has withdrawn its ambassador, SA is something of an outlier these days in its more militant anti-Israel position (it's going to take another generation or two before they get over Israel's cooperation with Apartheid government). Additionally, the East Africa block is not enamored of South Africa's continental ambitions. So there is no guarantee that other African nations -- particularly the East African block, which has the strongest trade relations with Israel -- will follow suit. And if they do, it is likely to be for a shorter period.
As for India, the current government of India is unlikely to give a crap. Even among the indian population generally, the rise of militant Hinduism and anti-Islam has shifted the broader India perception of the Israel/PA as colonialism with sympathy to the PA to broader anti-Islamic resistance.
So Israel hunkers down and bets on the long term. The calculus is that whatever short term pain there is, if they wait long enough the status quo will reassert itself. Israel's economy is now sufficiently diversified that it is unlikely to take a crippling blow from any economic boycott. Official sanctions are extremely unlikely given the fervor of U.S. support and the political complications among traditional PA allies.
How Does This End?
Sweetie, this is the Middle East. It never ends.
My personal take: Hamas played their hand well, and Israel rose to the bait. But it is unclear to me that it changes much in the long run.
To fully analyze the event and their potential aftermath, and what the sides were going for, it is necessary to step back and engage in a somewhat broader analysis. I am not trying to assign blame or right or wrong. Most people stop on the moral question and come down wherever they come down. My belief is that analysis is a separate-but-related issue from understanding the strategy and possible outcomes. It is not irrelevant or immaterial. But it is my belief that it is helpful to run the analysis along separate but related tracks.
Gaza is currently run by Hamas. In theory, Hamas and Fatah are supposed to be unifying. In practice, Hamas wants a deal with Fatah similar to what Hezbollah has in Lebanon. A major say in politics and an independent armed force. Fatah is not prepared to do that. They want Hamas to become a political party with no special status or privileges beyond being a political party.
Hamas is seriously on the outs with just about every major Arab Sunni government except Qatar because of their support for the Islamic Brotherhood back when they were running Egypt, and because the Sunni governments would like to settle the whole damn Israel/Palestine thing so they can concentrate on fighting Iran (and/or Turkey, which is also Sunni but not Arab and which has regional ambitions that the more ambitious players (i.e., Egypt and Saudi Arabia) dislike. Hamas has seen its overall support in Gaza and among the Palestinians generally erode as the armed resistance has yielded no results beyond even worse suffering in Gaza as compared to the West Bank territories run by Fatah.
Nevertheless, Hamas still enjoys considerable legitimacy and support from Palestinians for their armed resistance to "the Occupation" (by which they mean the existence of Israel as a Jewish state; polling shows very little support among Palestinians for a two-state solution). While Palestinians have determined that direct military confrontation of the kind employed in 2014, 2010 and 2007 is useless, they are not happy with the general cooperation of Fatah with Israel either.
Hamas recently underwent a major shift in leadership with the appointment of Ismail Hanayeh as operational commander in Gaza. Hanayeh has initiated a major shift in strategy. The recent protests are his first major operation.
Hanayeh's strategy is fairly straightforward but also fairly clever. The organized effort to cross the border into Israel by unarmed protesters creates a difficult problem for Israel. No government permits the crossing of its borders by unauthorized individuals. Use of deadly force to protect the border is generally regarded as permissible, even against unarmed border crossers. But the justification of shooting border crossers is a function of security -- border crossers may be assumed to be criminals or a security threat. When it is clear that border crossers are unarmed individuals, the rules of engagement change. (The United States is undergoing a flip from avoiding the use of deadly force to the use of deadly force.) A large mass of unarmed people crossing the border in protest and determined to penetrate the border therefore presents an insoluble dilemma to country: fire and use deadly force, and therefore take condemnation for firing on unarmed civilians, or allow penetration of the border.
To be clear, i do not consider Hanayeh's calculations to be particularly immoral. They regard this as war, and regard this protest as necessary to shift the political calculus. All the protesters were fully aware that the Israelis would use deadly force and volunteered. Nor is it clear to me that Israel had a good set of alternatives in their response. They reasoned that lesser means of crowd dispersal would be ineffective and that loss of life on the Palestinian side was inevitable. Again, the entire point of strategy from the Hamas side is to maneuver Israel into a no-win response. In this they were successful.
Tangible Outcomes From Hamas Strategy.
Hanayeh clearly recognizes that he needs to change Hamas' political status as outcasts in the Arab world, redirect world outrage against Israel, and re-establish Hamas legitimacy among Palestinians as a superior alternative to Fatah. In this they are largely successful. Indeed, news reports are that Hanayeh has gone to Egypt to negotiate with Egyptians for humanitarian support and economic aid (possibly with the promise of stopping the protests as a bargaining chip). Egypt's current government does not like Hamas because they are an offshoot of the Islamic Brotherhood and had close ties with the previous Egyptian government. Egypt also accuses Hamas of supporting ISIS in the Sinai, although Hamas denies this. Additionally, Hamas is suspect because it receives support from Iran.
But the protests and the Israeli deadly response have a predictable effect on Egyptian popular opinion. It makes it extremely hard for Sissi to reject Hamas' request, which is what Sissi would undoubtedly like to do. Egypt has been instrumental in the last few years in bringing economic devastation to Gaza as a means of forcing Hamas to surrender to Fatah. The last thing they want to do is alleviate that economic pressure when Gaza is on the brink of collapse. But the Egyptian people hugely support the Palestinian "martyrs" against the evil Zionist oppressors. Additionally, Egypt would gain some leadership points in the Arab world for being seen as brokering a cessation of violence on the Gaza border.
Depending on the outcome, the prospect of economic aid from Egypt and lifting the restrictions on the Egypt/Gaza border alone would be a victory that made the sacrifice of he protestors' lives worth it (at least from a military standpoint). But the result also enhances Hamas as the "true" leaders of the resistance with Palestinians in the West Bank, making it harder for Fatah to press aggressively for re-unification on its own terms. It drives a wedge between Israel and its potential Arab allies against Iran, preventing continuing normalization of relations between Israel and the Sunni Arab world. All of these serve Hamas' primary political objective.
Finally, and most significantly, the protests are designed to delegitimize the U.S. recognition of West Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and prevent other countries from following. In this, again, Hanayeh's strategy has been enormously successful. It is extremely easy to get people in the world angry at Trump. Even those who support Israel and support a two-state solution are likely to blame the move of the embassy to Jerusalem rather than Hamas for the deaths and injuries. Hanayeh may even hope to see a replay of the economic hardship that followed the Israeli military operation in 2002 and forced Sharon to pull Israel out of Gaza.
Israel Response: Whether the Storm
Israel's response is to play the long game and whether the storm. For one thing, Israel has relatively few options to the contrary. Israel's long-standing policies lock in its responses. Additionally, the refusal of Israel to negotiate directly with Hamas (in fairness, Hamas likewise refuses to negotiate with Israel) prevents the sort of negotiated settlement that has allowed Israel to negotiate deals with Fatah.
Israel's calculation is based on the assessment that nothing significant is likely to change that it can't manage. U.S. support is even more firm under Trump than under Bush. Bush understood the need to maintain European allies and Arab allies. Trump believes U.S. does what it wants and allies can suck it. But additionally, both Europe and the Arab world have changed since the 00s. However Sunni Arab governments may act in the short term, there is still Iran and other factors driving toward normalization of relations with Israel. Europe remains as pro-Palestinian and anti-Israel as ever, but the rise of the European right has enhanced both isolationism and anti-Arabism as well. While Israel is likely to see a decline in tourism and economic trade with the EU in the near term, I anticipate it will be considerably less of a decline than happened in the 00s.
Additionally, Israel has broader relations with India and various East African nations. While South Africa has withdrawn its ambassador, SA is something of an outlier these days in its more militant anti-Israel position (it's going to take another generation or two before they get over Israel's cooperation with Apartheid government). Additionally, the East Africa block is not enamored of South Africa's continental ambitions. So there is no guarantee that other African nations -- particularly the East African block, which has the strongest trade relations with Israel -- will follow suit. And if they do, it is likely to be for a shorter period.
As for India, the current government of India is unlikely to give a crap. Even among the indian population generally, the rise of militant Hinduism and anti-Islam has shifted the broader India perception of the Israel/PA as colonialism with sympathy to the PA to broader anti-Islamic resistance.
So Israel hunkers down and bets on the long term. The calculus is that whatever short term pain there is, if they wait long enough the status quo will reassert itself. Israel's economy is now sufficiently diversified that it is unlikely to take a crippling blow from any economic boycott. Official sanctions are extremely unlikely given the fervor of U.S. support and the political complications among traditional PA allies.
How Does This End?
Sweetie, this is the Middle East. It never ends.
no subject
Date: 2018-05-15 04:54 pm (UTC)On the whole it has seemed for a while that the Palestinians are doing a much better job of manipulating the court of public opinion than the Israelis, which is sadly ironic given the number of people who believe that Jews control the media.
no subject
Date: 2018-05-15 05:58 pm (UTC)Add to this the fact that apparently, Hamas wants martyrs and the IDF is willing to give them at least a small number (because, let's face it, if the IDF *really* wanted to give them martyrs the body count after yesterday would be in the hundreds or thousands).
no subject
Date: 2018-05-17 05:36 pm (UTC)